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Over the past 20 years, the advent of advanced techniques has significantly enhanced
our knowledge on the brain. Yet, our understanding of the physiological and pathological
functioning of the mind is still far from being exhaustive. Both the localizationist
and the reductionist neuroscientific approaches to psychiatric disorders have proven
to be largely unsatisfactory and are outdated. Accruing evidence suggests that
psychoanalysis can engage the neurosciences in a productive and mutually enriching
dialogue that may further our understanding of psychiatric disorders. In particular,
advances in brain connectivity research have provided evidence supporting the
convergence of neuroscientific findings and psychoanalysis and helped characterize
the circuitry and mechanisms that underlie higher brain functions. In the present paper
we discuss how knowledge on brain connectivity can impact neuropsychoanalysis,
with a particular focus on schizophrenia. Brain connectivity studies in schizophrenic
patients indicate complex alterations in brain functioning and circuitry, with particular
emphasis on the role of cortical midline structures (CMS) and the default mode
network (DMN). These networks seem to represent neural correlates of psychodynamic
concepts central to the understanding of schizophrenia and of core psychopathological
alterations of this disorder (i.e., ego disturbances and impaired primary process
thinking).
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INTRODUCTION
Current etiological models of mental disorders are complex and multifactorial. The dichotomy
between biological and psychological interpretations is outdated. The advent of non-
invasive techniques to explore brain functioning has renewed interest in the interplay
between biological and psychological factors, originally put forward in Freud’s (1895)
‘‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’’ but dismissed due to lack of sufficient scientific
evidence (Panksepp, 1998; Solms and Solms-Kaplan, 2000; Solms and Turnbull, 2002;
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Fonagy, 2003; Schore, 2003; Solms, 2004; Mancia,
2006b).
Neuroscientific research has recently moved away from
the traditional field of cognitive sciences (language, memory,
attention, perception, etc.) towards the study of mental disorders,
in order to investigate possible modifications in neural patterns
related to clinical improvements following psychotherapeutic
interventions (Kandel, 1998; Demertzi et al., 2009; Cozolino,
2010; Toyokawa et al., 2011).
Kandel (1989) was the first to highlight that learning
processes can permanently modify and reinforce synaptic
connections. He later focused on gene-environment interaction
research and theorized a novel biological approach to psychiatry
and psychotherapy, in which the latter is conceived as a
learning process that can, therefore, determine changes
in genes and modify the strength of synaptic connections
(Kandel, 1999, 2005). Several subsequent studies have
demonstrated that successful talk-based interventions may
lead to significant brain changes (Beauregard, 2007). More
recently, a number of studies investigated brain activation
during cognitive or perceptual tasks, with the aim of
identifying neural correlates of various psychopathological
conditions (McGuire et al., 1994; Viinamaki et al.,
1998; Dierks et al., 1999; Furmark et al., 2002; Paquette
et al., 2003; Rauch, 2003; Linden, 2006; Karlsonn, 2011;
Leichsenring and Rabung, 2011). The use of sophisticated
neuroimaging techniques in these studies has led to a shift
in the conceptualization of mental disorders, removing
the emphasis on the alterations of specific brain areas and
highlighting alterations in their interactions within larger neural
networks.
Brain connectivity studies thus appear to be particularly
promising in elucidating the complex architecture of
structural and functional brain networks underlying
psychological functions. Though psychiatric diagnostic
categories are essentially objective and symptom-based,
subjective elements (i.e., the patient’s perception of his own
self and of others) are essential to a comprehensive study of
mental disorders. Panksepp and Solms (2012) underscored
how neuropsychoanalysis has drawn attention to the first-
person experience in the neuroscientific approach to the
mind, thus improving our understanding of the emotional
subjective level in psychiatric disorders and promoting
more patient-tailored interventions. Neuropsychoanalysis
has focused on linking psychodynamic concepts to specific
neuronal mechanisms. Among others, memory (Kandel,
1998; Mancia, 2004, 2006a,b), dreams (Solms, 1997, 2000;
Solms and Turnbull, 2002; Mancia, 2004; Hobson, 2009;
Northoff, 2011), affect (Panksepp, 1998), defense mechanisms
(Fonagy, 2003; Northoff and Boeker, 2006; Feinberg, 2011;
Northoff, 2011), the Self and Ego functions have been
singled out as major areas of interest. Brain connectivity
research has provided evidence supporting the notion that
the study of the Self and Ego functions is particularly
relevant to the understanding of schizophrenia; in the
present paper we will, therefore, focus primarily on these
two areas.
THE NEUROSCIENCE-PSYCHOANALYSIS
INTERFACE
The interconnection between psychoanalysis and neuroscience
goes beyond evidence of efficacy alone. Psychoanalytic theories
represent an important conceptual framework for neuroscientific
findings and similarly, neuroscience may help provide the
neurobiological foundations to psychoanalytic concepts.
Identifying neural correlates of specific psychodynamic
mechanisms may help plan psychotherapy and other treatments
for psychiatric disorders. Neuropsychoanalysis acknowledges
the deep evolutionary roots of the human mind and of
emotional disorders, and favors a more coherent understanding
of primary-process brain affective networks (Panksepp, 2011).
The psychoanalytic perspective on mental functioning can
guide neuroscientific research toward a better understanding
of basic psychodynamic concepts, such as the Ego, defence
mechanisms, dream functions and projection of mental states
(Luciani et al., 2014), as well as enhance knowledge in
the fields of memory, trauma, attachment, empathy, the
self. Specific topics (e.g., neural correlates of emotions and
empathy) are nowadays considered important new areas of
investigation (Panksepp, 1998; Gallese, 2008; Panksepp and
Biven, 2012).
Theoretically, psychoanalysis anticipated the neuroscientific
approach postulating the existence of hierarchical systems
comprising complex mental functions resulting from
interactions between interconnected brain regions. Functional
neuroimaging provides a promising avenue for the study of
these functional networks, though new experimental studies
that consider the psychoanalytic approach to mental functioning
are needed. To this end, numerous neuropsychoanalytic studies
promoting a dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience
and investigating neuroscientific theories that can be enhanced
by psychoanalytic metapsychology have been conducted (for
a review, see Fotopoulou et al., 2012). In the present article,
we focused on two concepts in particular, the ‘‘Self’’ and the
‘‘Ego functions and the unconscious’’, with the ultimate goal
of shedding light on specific aspects of schizophrenia. This
choice was largely motivated by the fact that neuroscientific
research has provided evidence supporting the notion that the
study of the Self and Ego functions is particularly relevant to
the understanding of schizophrenia. This implies a clinical
endeavor to focus on the subjective experience of symptoms
and on how perception of one’s self influences perception
of the outside world. From a technical standpoint this also
implies investigating the complex functioning of specific brain
networks.
BRAIN CONNECTIVITY
Over the last few years, several neuroimaging studies explored
brain connectivity. Technically, there are three types of
connectivity: (i) anatomical connectivity, defined as patterns of
anatomical links between neuronal populations or anatomically
defined brain regions; (ii) functional connectivity, defined as
patterns of statistical correlations between distinct activated
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brain areas; and (iii) effective connectivity, defined as causal
interactions between specific groups of neurons (Friston, 1994).
The relationship between these different types of connectivity
is one of the most interesting and innovative fields of
experimental neuroscience. This inevitably raises the following
question: ‘‘how does brain connectivity research contribute to
neuropsychoanalysis?’’
This new perspective provokes worthwhile questions and
debate and may help further our understanding of complex
mental phenomena such as consciousness, the influences of
different contexts on meaning attribution, the representation
of the self and of others (Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin, 2013;
Ionta et al., 2014; Li et al., 2014; Rudorf and Hare, 2014;
Touskova and Bob, 2015). Recent reviews (van Veluw and
Chance, 2014; Murray et al., 2014) evidenced that different
connectivity patterns are involved in self-representation and in
the representation of others: in 193 studies healthy subjects
were administered self-related tasks (Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin,
2013), while in 106 studies others-related tasks were used
(Li et al., 2014). Meta-analytic connectivity modeling (van
Veluw and Chance, 2014) showed selective activation of
the pregenual anterior cingulate during self-related tasks and
selective activation of the posterior cingulate and precuneus
during others-related tasks. This meta-analysis also highlighted
a shared connectivity pattern between self- and others-related
tasks at the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and at the medial
orbitofrontal cortex, thus providing neuroscientific evidence of
the intricate relationship between representations of the self and
of others. These findings may give new insight into disorders
such as autism, schizophrenia and borderline personality
disorder, in which the representations of the self and of others are
dysfunctional or disrupted (van Veluw and Chance, 2014). It is
worth noting that while modifying self-representation in relation
to others is a challenging process, the interchange between
self and other representations spontaneously takes place during
transference-countertransference interactions in transference-
focused psychotherapies as well as in other social relations.
Such clinical evidence suggests that, rather than the distinct
conceptualizations, the interactive dynamic relationship between
self and other representations is central, (Kernberg et al., 2008;
Yeomans et al., 2013). Future studies should investigate whether
specific interactions between self and other representations
are associated with specific brain connectivity patterns, and
whether changes in these representations, as detectable in
the transference dynamics, bring about modifications in brain
connectivity.
THE SELF
In recent years, neuroscientific work has called attention
to the study of the Self, previously confined to philosophy
and psychology (Gallagher, 2000; Damasio, 2003; Kircher and
David, 2003). Damasio (1999, 2003) and Panksepp (1998, 2003)
suggested the existence of a ‘‘proto-self’’ in the sensory and
motor domains. A ‘‘minimal self’’ (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher
and Frith, 2003) or a ‘‘core or mental self’’ (Damasio, 1999,
2003), an ‘‘autobiographical self’’ (Damasio, 1999, 2003) and
a ‘‘narrative self’’ (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher and Frith, 2003)
have also been described. Beyond differences in definitions, it
is possible to identify ‘‘self-related processes’’, which comprise
stimuli that are experienced as strongly related to one’s own
person. It is very important to consider the self-stimulus
relationship: the process of relating stimuli to the self should
not be considered an isolated phenomenon, but rather as
embedded in a larger, more complex process that depends on the
environmental context (Clark, 1999; Northoff, 2004).
The Cortical Midline Structures (CMS) are brain areas
related to self-referential experiences (Kelley et al., 2002).
However, specific features of the self are also related to other
cerebral regions (i.e., self-agency to right posterior insula and
right inferior parietal cortex, self-ownership to right parietal
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex; Northoff, 2004). The
self therefore results from the integration of different areas,
which necessarily involves neural connectivity. Northoff (2012)
suggested that CMS might represent the neural correlate of the
‘‘core self’’, defined by Damasio as the continuous interaction
between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli that allow to perceive
the self as a unit. CMS are activated in resting state conditions,
and deactivated during cognitive tasks (Gusnard and Raichle,
2001; Raichle et al., 2001). Such physiological situation is linked
to the psychological condition in which the core self is replaced
and masked by cognitive activity, with a subjective experience of
‘‘permanent self’’ that represents a permanent baseline status for
other psychological activities.
According to Northoff’s theory, neuroscientific research may
go beyond the function and localization-based approach, moving
from the ‘‘Neural Correlates of Psychodynamics’’ (NCC) to the
‘‘Neural Predisposition of Psychodynamics’’ (NPP), which refers
to the neural condition of mental contents. NPP, in terms of
empirical brain function, may refer to resting state activity and
its ‘‘spatiotemporal structure’’, which is the result of two main
characteristics of resting state activity, namely low frequency
fluctuations and functional connectivity patterns. The ‘‘virtual’’
concept of ‘‘Spatiotemporal Structure’’ may be compared to
the Freudian approach to the ‘‘Psychological Structure’’ of the
psychic apparatus, in that both are related to a process and
an organization rather than a physical or psychological entity.
The psychological predisposition of psychodynamic processes
based on the Freudian psychological structure may also be
related to resting state spatiotemporal structure and the so-called
neural predisposition. From this point of view, resting state
activity, with its spatiotemporal features that include functional
connectivity between brain regions, could represent a model
associated with Freudian Ego functions and dreams (for an
overview, see Northoff, 2012).
Neuroscience looked into various aspects of the Self. In studies
on schizophrenia, the relationship between the Self and the
other has been particularly emphasized. Since the beginning
of the 19th Century, phenomenology attributed a crucial role
to the self and its pre-reflective attunement to the external
world in schizophrenic psychopathology (Bleuler, 1911/1950;
Minkowski, 1927). More recently, schizophrenia research has
focused on abnormalities of the self (so-called ego-disturbances)
and schizophrenia has been primarily characterized as a disorder
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of the self-other relationship (Parnas et al., 2002; Kircher
and David, 2003; Nelson et al., 2009). Several empirical
findings suggest that altered self-experience may result in
an abnormal self-other relationship (Bentall et al., 1991;
Ihnen et al., 1998; Peled et al., 2000; Voss et al., 2010;
Morgan et al., 2011). Aberrant neural connectivity has been
proposed as a basic feature of schizophrenic pathophysiology
(Volkow et al., 1988; Meyer-Lindenberg and Weinberger,
2006). Neuroimaging research suggests aberrant structural and
functional connectivity in schizophrenic patients (Walterfang
et al., 2006; Skudlarski et al., 2010; Woodward et al., 2011;
Fornito et al., 2012). However, the links between neural
connectivity and social dysfunction are still poorly understood.
Ebisch et al. (2013) performed a neuroimaging study with a
social perception task on first episode schizophrenic patients,
with the aim of highlighting brain functioning and its
correlation with prodromal symptoms and self-other distinction
abilities. The results of this study showed aberrant activation
in the posterior insula, with impaired self-other distinction
and reduced activation in the ventral premotor cortex,
which negatively correlated with self-experience disturbances.
These findings portray dysfunctional social perception in
schizophrenia as a complex impairment involving multiple
neural processing levels (Ebisch et al., 2013). Further connectivity
analyses evidenced aberrant functional interactions of the
posterior insula and the ventral premotor cortex with the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), a midline region that
plays a major role in mediating self-experience, suggesting
an imbalance in the processing of internally and externally
guided information and its abnormal integration with self-
referential processing (Ebisch et al., 2014). This study provided
insights on how impairments in the self-other relationship
in schizophrenia may relate to altered functional interaction
patterns.
Other investigations of resting state activity and functional
connectivity in schizophrenia evidenced that resting state
functional connectivity within the CMS and the default mode
network (DMN) tends to increase. On the other hand, functional
connectivity of the Control Executive Network (CEN) is reduced
in schizophrenia (Hoptman et al., 2010; Karbasforoushan and
Woodward, 2012). The stronger resting state activity and
functional connectivity within the CMS and the DMN could be
viewed as functional correlates of a greater focus on internal
mental contents that are more related to the self. Conversely,
stronger resting state activity and functional connectivity within
the lateral regions and the CEN are related to an increase in
external mental contents and awareness (Vanhaudenhuyse et al.,
2011). The opposite functioning between DMN and CEN may
represent the neural correlate of internal and external mental
content. The confusion between internal and external mental
contents that typically characterizes schizophrenic symptoms
such as thought insertion, thought withdrawal, passivity
symptoms and auditory hallucinations (Sommer et al., 2012)
might be related to an imbalance between the two networks.
Even though the exact meaning of the resting state abnormalities
for psychiatric symptoms remains unclear, Northoff (2015)
suggests a direct link between abnormalities of the resting state
spatiotemporal structure and psychopathological symptoms such
as ego disturbances and auditory hallucinations.
Given that the CMS may well represent the neural correlate
of the ‘‘core self’’, it is likely that abnormal activity in the CMS
underlies anomalous self-perception and self-other relationship
in schizophrenia. This hypothesis warrants further investigation
in studies that link specific network alterations with the distinct
subjective experiences of the pathological condition. In fact, in
schizophrenia altered perception of internal and external stimuli
reflects qualitative disturbances in discriminating between one’s
own self and others. Future research on schizophrenia should
take into account neuropsychoanalytic conceptualizations and
focus on the study of the ‘‘Spatiotemporal Structure’’, in
order to further explore the basic and subjective aspects of
this disorder. In fact, psychoanalysis’ contention that the self-
others relationship is central to psychological development
and change suggests that basic neural mechanisms (such as
CMS functioning) may be affected over time by relational
experiences and the environment in general. In this view,
psychoanalytic theory may provide a valuable theoretical basis
for neuroscientific studies on the self and its subjective
experiences.
THE EGO FUNCTIONS AND THE
UNCONSCIOUS
To date, structural and functional correlates for the
psychodynamic notion of unconscious processes (i.e., mental
processes and contents that are defensively removed as a result
of conflicting attitudes) have not been identified. In recent
years, there has been an increasing interest, in unconscious
processes; neuroscientific studies have, in fact, tested subliminal
perceptions, implicit cognition, emotion processing and
interoceptive perceptions with empirical methods (Stein
et al., 2006; Craig, 2009). Though many studies indicate that
unconscious processes influence awareness (for a review,
see Berlin, 2011), the cognitive view of the unconscious
differs from the psychodynamic notion of unconscious, which
encompasses affect and motivation (Turnbull and Solms, 2007).
Psychoanalytic theory holds that we are partly unaware of what
we really feel. Studies on both healthy and brain-injured subjects
demonstrated that even when a stimulus is not consciously
perceived, it modulates neural activity and generates an
emotional response. Custers and Aarts (2010) reviewed studies
demonstrating the existence of an ‘‘unconscious will’’, by which
we persevere a goal regardless of conscious awareness.
In light of Freud’s distinction between primary and secondary
processes (the functioning of the unconscious and the Ego,
respectively), Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010) postulated
that Freud’s description of ego functioning and development
corresponds to the DMN functioning and its reciprocal
exchanges with other brain networks. Freud (1895, 1900)
described the secondary process as ‘‘bound’’ and ‘‘inhibited’’,
whereas the primary process is ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘motile’’. The
functional connectivity of the DMN appears to differ in
childhood as compared to adulthood, and is altered in many
brain disorders (Ouchi and Kikuchi, 2012). Possibly, loss of
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top-down control over limbic activity in hierarchically lower
systems mirrors loss of ego control over the primary process.
Freud held that the mode of normal waking consciousness
depends on the existence of an equilibrium between the pressing
forces of the primary process (entailed by the id) and the counter
forces of the secondary process (entailed by the ego). This
description is in line with current models of cognition based on
hierarchical Bayesian inference and free energy, where backward
connections from higher cortical areas work to reduce the free
energy of lower areas (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010). From
a clinical point of view, this approach provides novel insight
on the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. An altered functional
connectivity between limbic and cortical nodes of the DMN
may predict symptoms of ego disturbance or primary process
thinking in schizophrenia, mainly in the prodromal phase when
these symptoms are prevalent (Parnas and Handest, 2003).
The displacement of energy from a ‘‘reservoir’’ to activity such
as control of the external world is consistent with the functioning
of the DMN and its relation with the dorsal attention system
during goal-directed actions (Raichle et al., 2001). Considering
that disease severity positively correlates with DMN connectivity,
reduced task-evoked suppression of DMN activity observed in
schizophrenia may be associated with reduced engagement with
the external world (Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009).
CONCLUSIONS
A rich body of literature suggests that abnormalities in
the interactions of brain network components play a
vital role in psychiatric disorders, and damage to specific
functional connectivity networks can result in corresponding
psychopathology. Studies on brain connectivity in schizophrenia
and depressive disorders have improved knowledge on how
complex alterations in brain functioning and neural network
interaction underlie these disorders. Both the localizationist
and the reductionist neuroscientific approaches to psychiatric
disorders are outdated. While structural models of mind
functioning appear to be insufficient, psychoanalytic theory
provides a more appropriate organizational model of the
mind, that matches recent neuroscientific findings on intrinsic
brain networks. Many correlations between neuroscience
and the theories of psychoanalysis have, in fact, been
validated, and considerable progress has been made toward
identifying neural correlates of abnormal self-processing in
different psychiatric disorders, as maintained by psychoanalytic
conceptualizations.
Psychoanalysis anticipated the neuroscientific approach
postulating the existence of hierarchical systems comprising
complex mental functions resulting from interactions between
interconnected brain regions. To this respect, the Freudian
‘‘Psychological Structure’’ appears to be consistent with the
neuroscientific approach based on brain connectivity. The CMS
and their networks (right posterior insula, right inferior parietal
cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex) may represent neural
correlates of the ‘‘core self’’, defined as the continuous interaction
between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli, allowing the self to
feel as a unit (Northoff, 2012). CMS are activated in resting state
condition and deactivated during cognitive tasks.
Ego functioning most likely corresponds to the activation of
the DMN and its reciprocal exchanges with other brain networks.
An altered functional connectivity between cortical and limbic
nodes of the DMN may predict symptoms of ego disturbance,
such as alterations of primary process thinking in schizophrenia
or attribution of negative emotions to the self in depressive
disorders.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that brain connectivity
research supports the convergence of neuroscientific findings
and psychoanalysis, allowing for a new understanding of
some fundamental concepts and symptomatic configurations.
A more in-depth understanding of the functionally relevant
nodes of each network, and the interactions between them,
will help us advance toward a more complete theory of
self-representation in the brain. Linking these neuroscientific
findings and psychoanalytic theoretical models may result in
new experimental paradigms and allow for investigation of the
functional changes in the brain following psychotherapy, thus
ultimately improving treatments.
Though the heuristic potential of psychoanalysis may support
new acquisitions on brain connectivity, there is still much
to investigate to fully understand mental functioning in both
physiological and pathological conditions. The progress in
neuroimaging techniques and the use, besides fMRI, of other
techniques such as MEG, TMS and EEG (also combined
with fMRI) will surely contribute to a deeper understanding.
On the other hand, dynamic brain processes underlying
mental functioning are not likely to be fully understood
by means of neuroimaging techniques alone. Neuroscientific
studies would benefit from more appropriate experimental
paradigms that emphasize subjectivity and from interpretation
of data that takes into account the complexity of the human
mind.
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